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ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATE URGES THIS COURT TO CONSIDER POSSIBILITIES
RATHER THAN THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL
Instead of focusing on the evidence presented at trial, the State urges this court to

consider possibilities if inferences are drawn. The State speculates that because
Stringham had alcohol in his system he could not have started the car if an interlock
device was installed. This speculation assumes that he did not consume the alcohol after
the car was started or have one of the other occupants of the car start the vehicle. The
State also speculates that because Stringham did not testify concerning an interlock that it
necessarily must follow that interlock device was not installed. This speculation ignores
the fact that Stringham was never asked if an interlock device was installed. Furthermore,
this line of speculation assumes that Stringham would want to acknowledged that the
interlock device was installed. However, this reasoning is likewise shortsighted because
such an acknowledgment would likely subject Stringham to more criminal liability if it
was shown that he removed the device to thwart an investigation.
The bigger issue is it that the foregoing speculation contradicts the only direct
evidence presented at trial. Specifically, the only direct evidence was from the
investigating officer whose testimony concerning the interlock device was that "when I
first approached I did notice one, and then after I found this information, and later during
the impound of the vehicle, there was no interlock in the vehicle." (R.268). Stringham
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respectfully submits that his conviction was based on speculation and his counsel's failure
to provide any real legal assistance on the interlock violation.
II.

STRINGHAM HAS MET HIS BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
The State's argument when viewed in its totality is that Stringham cannot meet

either Strickland element because he did not tell the officer or the trial court that he had
an interlock device in the car. Appellee's Brief at 9. Stringham was never specifically
asked in either situation whether he had an interlock device in the car. (R. 190-205). As is
addressed supra, there are many reasons why Stringham would not desire to disclose such
information. Nevertheless, if Stringham is guilty of all offenses which he did not take the
initiative to deny then he is indeed guilty of an interlock violation. This approach would
clearly be a perversion of the State's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
A.

Mr. Humiston's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.

Stringham does not lightly submit a claim that Mr. Humiston's performance was
ineffective. However, it is difficult to assert any fact from the record which demonstrates
that Stringham received any assistance of counsel on the charge of an interlock violation.
The State does not marshal any facts which tend to show that Mr. Humiston's
performance was effective. Stringhami was convicted of Operating a Vehicle without an
Interlock System in violation of U.C.A. §4 l-6a-518.2(3). This statute states, "An
interlock restricted driver that operated or is in actual physical control of a vehicle in this
-2-
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state without an ignition interlock system is guilty of a class B misdemeanor." Thus, the
crime has three simple elements-that a 1) restricted driver 2) operates or is in actual
physical control of a vehicle 3) without an ignition interlock system.
To meet this burden the only evidence presented by the State concerning whether
Stringham was operating a vehicle without an ignition interlock system was Officer
Gledhill's testimony that "when I first approached I did notice one, and then after I found
this information, and later during the impound of the vehicle, there was no interlock in the
vehicle." (R. 268). Mr. Humiston did not address Officer Gledhill's testimony on cross
examination, did not move to dismiss for lack of evidence when the State rested, did not
move for directed verdict and failed to ever even mention the exculpatory evidence to the
jury. Stringham's counsel never even asserted that the evidence on the ignition interlock
was ambiguous.
Stringham submits that a finding that Mr. Humiston's representation met an
objective standard of reasonableness would be bad public policy and perhaps a violation
of his right to competent counsel. Counsel has little to no obligation at trial if the
representation at issue is not deemed insufficient, especially when considering the basic
nature of the charge and the simplicity of the testimony. Stringham also respectfully
asserts that any decision on representation should be judged by the basic notion that
defendants have a right to effective assistance of counsel. See generally, Menzies v.
Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 480 (Utah, 2006).

-3-
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B.

But for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of trial would have been different.

The State's argument is essentially that because Stringham did not tell the officer
or the trial court that he had an interlock device in the car the lack of evidence constitutes
circumstantial evidence. Appellee's Brief at 9-10. The State then goes on to argue that
this circumstantial evidence shows that regardless of counsel's performance the outcome
of trial would have been the same. Id. Stringham does not submit that verdicts cannot
properly be reached by exclusively considering circumstantial evidence. Indeed, the Utah
Supreme Court noted that "it has long been established" that the elements needed to make
out a cause of action "may be proven by direct and by circumstantial evidence." State v.
Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1976) (citing State v. Richards, 29 Utah 310, 81 P. 142
(1905)).

. * "fi"

'' '

'

*• "* *' • •

However, lack of evidence is not the same thing as evidence of absence. Here,
because the Stringham didn't volunteer information that an interlock was installed the
State asserts that his failure to do so acts as circumstantial evidence that no such device
was installed. Appellee's Brief at 9. When considering the absence of evidence as
circumstantial evidence of absence the State asserts that "the evidence was clearly
sufficient to support a finding that he had no interlock device installed in his car." Id.
Stringham however respectfully assents that forgoing argument by the State does nothing
to show the second Strickland element cannot be met.
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To prevail in a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel "the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Utah courts have restated the requirement as a required
showing that "but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the trial would have been different." Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT
72,\19,61R3d978.
Stringham asserts that simply bringing the officer's testimony to the jury's
attention would have created a reasonable probability of a different outcome at the trial.
In reading the closing arguments in their entirety, the jury is clearly led to believe that all
the evidence is uncontroverted. (R.305-314). That portrayal would have been soundly
rebutted by simply restating Officer Gledhill's testimony that "when I first approached I
did notice one" (R. 268;. A reasonable recitation of the evidence is thai when Officer
Gledhill first approached Stringham's vehicle he viewed an interlock device installed, but
later during an inventory of the vehicle the interlock was missing. The evidence also
showed that Stringham had been drinking, was a restricted driver and was in control of
the vehicle. Nevertheless, the evidence shows that an interlock device was installed when
he was driving and later removed. This should have been presented to the court and the
jury and the record shows that it was not. Stringham therefore respectfully asserts that the
Strickland elements have been met.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Stringham's class B misdemeanor conviction for
violation of U.C.A. §41-6a-518.2(3), Operating a Vehicle without an Ignition Interlock
System, should be reversed.
Dated this QO day of December, 2012.

William L. Reynolas
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